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While concessions to labour mobility at the international level seem off the 
agenda, with the General Agreements on Trades in Services essentially tabled, the 
past decades have produced a proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs), 
some of which are facilitating labour mobility specifically. In this paper, the author 
first conducts a comparative overview of RTAs that have a form of labour mobility 
programmes: namely, ECOWAS, ASEAN, the European Union, NAFTA, 
CARICOM and MERCOSUR.  
 
Building on an overview of the regulatory frameworks, institutions and legal 
instruments of these RTAs, the author seeks to find if patterns or lessons to be 
learned emerge that are relevant from a global perspective and to enhance the legal 
architecture of international labour mobility. The findings show positive outcomes, 
with some RTAs generating trade benefits and even moving forward with a 
common passport based on the newly shared regional identity, and at times even 
creating dispute settlement and legal systems for regional litigious matters. On the 
other hand, this exercise also points to various problems such as the poor 
implementation of the labour mobility provisions, to overly strict restrictions based 
on skill and to difficulty securing documents to benefit from the labour mobility 
programmes - in some of the agreements. 
 
In the second part, the author discusses these challenges faced in these 
regional systems. She notes that prioritising skilled as opposed to low-skilled 
workers has not yielded a comparative advantage and may also be fostering 
irregular movements. She also highlights that trade liabilities emerge from the 
association of countries with similar levels of development and that it accentuates 
the North-South paradigm. These problems disrupt access to the benefits of the 
programmes, which ultimately creates irregular migrations and uneven labour 
standards for migrant workers. Finally, the author finds that most RTAs reviewed 
are developing their own legal frameworks with limited interest for the 
international instruments available, which are at best a source of inspiration. 
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In the third part, the author invites the reader to challenge many 
preconceived ideas on international mobility emerging from the first two sections, 
and shares her thoughts on ways forward to build an international framework, based 
on existing scholarly work and considering the unpopularity of the GATS. She 
concludes with a discussion on ‘new regionalism’ as an alternative until a shared 
international framework to facilitate migrations is set up, with the possibility of a 
merger between RTAs from the North and the South. This, she argues, could 
possibly unleash the full benefits of labour mobility such as increased GDPs, 
poverty reduction and tackling irregular migrations; benefits that have not been 
entirely felt to date.   
 
KEYWORDS: migration, labour mobility, international law, GATS, trade, regional 
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BUILDING OR STUMBLING, BLOCKS ANYHOW: A COMPARATIVE 
APPROACH OF REGIONAL LABOUR MOBILITY FRAMEWORKS 
TOWARDS GLOBAL SOLUTIONS 
 
‘The current anti-globalization non-system for labour mobility is lose-lose- lose: 
unjust in frustrating the legitimate desires of those who would like the opportunity 
to move but are blocked, unnecessarily cruel and inequitable to many who do 
manage to move, and ultimately ineffective in meeting recipient countries’ desire 
for complete border control’1 
 
- Lant Pritchett, Professor of the Practice of International Development at the 
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University & and Rebekah Smith, 
Migration Policy Consultant at The World Bank 
 
‘There is an imperative need for fresh approaches and bold initiatives to promote 
international labour mobility for the welfare of the global community.’2 
 
- Piyasiri Wickramasekara, Senior specialist with the International Labour 
Organisation  
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Whether they were free to do so or not, humans have always circled the 
globe in search of a better life. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that despite a 
tighter enforcement of political borders in the past decades, citizens of all nations 
persist in this quest, through regular or irregular channels, and sometimes at the risk 
of their own lives.3 
 
This dissertation explores a counter-current to such borders: regional trade 
agreements that ease the circulation of workers from fellow regional member states 
on their territory. While concessions with regard to labour mobility at the 
international level seem stuck at the status quo with the General Agreements on 
Trades in Services (hereafter GATS) essentially tabled, recent decades have shown 
																																																								
1 Prittchett Lant and Rebekah Smith. ‘Is there a Goldilocks Solution? “Just Right” Promotion of 
Labor Mobility.’ Centre for Global Development Policy Paper 094 (2016), Centre for Global 
Development Online. Web. Nov. 7, 2017, Page 13. 
2 Wickramasekara, P., ‘Globalisation, International Labour Migration and the Rights of Migrant 
Workers.’ Third World Quarterly 29.7 (2008): 1247-1264, Page 1247. 
3 Squire, Vicki. ‘Governing Migration through death in Europe and the US: Identification, Burial 
and the Crisis of Modern Humanism.’ European Journal of International Relation 23.2 (2016): 
513-532, Page 514.  
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a proliferation of regional trade agreements, mostly to facilitate the flow of goods 
but also, at times, for services.4  
 
These regional unions were formed for various reasons, but most of them 
have geographic proximity, shared history and, at times, language in common.5 The 
popularity of these frameworks has risen in recent years and most of them were also 
established to weigh in more heavily at the negotiating table and to echo what the 
European Union and North American Free Trade Agreement (hereafter NAFTA’) 
had set in motion.6 These agreements are a manifestation that some states have 
decided to open their markets to neighbouring service providers.  
 
The purpose of this paper is to conduct an overview of regional trade 
agreements that have any form of common labour mobility programmes, to 
examine the regulatory frameworks of such programmes when relevant, and to 
determine if patterns or lessons to be learned emerge from a global perspective. 
While the literature on regional trade agreements per se is plentiful, fewer authors 
have focused strictly on labour mobility. Indeed, there is a gap in academic research 
when it comes to international mobility, given the pressing need for original 
political and legislative solutions to manage immigration, especially in the way 
policies may be affecting trade in services.7 As Pritchett and Smith put it:  
 
‘An examination of the top ten most cited papers by thirteen top 
development economists finds that only one of those 130 papers 
deals with international migration as a primary topic. This is not 
because none of these authors ever produce works on migration 
(many have) but these are not the papers that garner high profile 
publication, citation, and attention. … Moreover, much of the 
academic research on migration focuses on the consequences on host 
																																																								
4  GATS, ‘General Agreement on Trade in Services, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 1B’, www.wto.org, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 
1167. Web. Jan. 15, 2018; Roy, M., Marchetti, J. & Lim, H., ‘Services liberalization in the new 
generation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs): How much further than the GATS?.’ World 
Trade Review 6.2 (2007): 155-192, Pages 161, 162. 
5 Bravo, Karen E. ‘Regional Trade Arrangements and Labor Liberalization: (Lost) Opportunities for 
Experimentation?’. Saint Louis University Public Law Review 28 (2008): 78-114, Page 108. 
6  Mouhoud, El Mouhoub. Les nouvelles migrations : un enjeu Nord-Sud de la mondialisation. 
London : Universalis, 2006. Print. Page 36. 
7 OECD, The Future of International Migration to OECD Countries, Paris : OECD Publishing, 
2009. Bibliothèque Nationale du Québec. Web. Jan. 11, 2018, Page 9 ; Borchet et al. ‘Policy 
Barriers to International Trade in Services.’The World Bank Economic Review 28.1 (2014) :162–
188. Oxford Academic Online. Web. Feb. 2, 2018, Abstract. 
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countries, even though all agree these are a tiny fraction of the gains 
to the movers.’8 
 
In the course of this paper, we will first examine existing agreements that 
have labour mobility provisions, regardless of the implementation stage. We have 
chosen to approach these RTAs by the continent on which they are taking place. 
With the complexity and multiplicity of multilateral agreements, this will facilitate 
the reading and narrow down our analysis. For each of them, we will discuss what 
academic research and governmental reports tell us so far about their performance 
and frameworks.  
 
In the second part of this paper, we will build upon the findings that emerge 
from this exercise to explore if there are any lessons to be learned for states 
interested in enhancing or creating labour mobility programmes or to lay the 
foundations of a more fluid labour mobility system on a global scale, as prescribed 
by the drafters of the GATS. Indeed, this author concurs with Marion Panizzon’s 
view that the GATS, still the only generally accepted body of law to facilitate 
labour migration, is too technical, ambiguous and narrow to seal an increasingly 
fractured system.9 In the third part, we present our comments and position on ways 
forward to tackle the issues exposed in the first two parts. 
 
2. PRELIMINARY REMARKS 
 
2.1.  Glossary of abbreviations 
 
AEC: ASEAN Economic Commnunity 
 
ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations  
 
AFTA: Asian Free Trade Area  
 
CARICOM: Caribbean Community and Common Market  
 
CARIFORUM: CARICOM signatories to the Georgetown Agreement with other 
Pacific Group of states (ACP)  
																																																								
8 Lant Pritchett and Rebekah Smith. Ibid, Note 1. Page 10.  
9 Panizzon, Marion. ‘Trade and Labor Migration GATS Mode 4 and Migration Agreements’, 




CFTA: Continental Free Trade Area 
 
COMESA: Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa 
 
CUFTA: 1988 Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement 
 
DR-CAFTA: Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Area 
 
EAC: East African Community 
 
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States  
 
EU: European Union 
 
GATS: General Agreement on Trade in Services 
  
GATT: General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
 
ILO: International Labour Organisation 
 
IMF: International Monetary Fund 
 
IOM: International Organization for Migration 
 
MERCOSUR: Southern Cone Common Market  
 
NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement  
 
OCDE: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  
 
OHCHR: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights  
 
RTA: Regional Trade Agreements  
 
SADC: Southern African Development Community 
 
TiSA: Trade in Services Agreement  
 
UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  
 
WTO: World Trade Organization 
 
2.2.  Definitions 
 
‘Developing’ and ‘Developed’ countries 
Though there are many nuances to be taken into account when discussing the 
economic classification of countries, we must refer to levels of development for 
	 9 
our discussion.10 We will use the United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs classification of countries when referring to ‘developed’, 
‘developing’ and ‘least developed’ countries.11   
Irregular migration 
 
Also referred to as illegal migration (although neither expressions have an 
internationally accepted definition), irregular migration refers to a migration in 
contravention of the regulations of the country of origin, transit or destination, 
whether the entry into the territory was irregular or whether the immigrant 




For the purpose of this research, labour markets refer to agreements between more 
than two countries, whether bearing restrictions or not, to have a free flow of 
labour, whether skilled, unskilled or both, without more technical barriers such as 
visa requirements or work permit applications. Though the usual levels of 
integration as outlined in the GATS are free trade area, customs union, common 
market, and economic and political union, this research does not intend to follow 





Though a definition of ‘labour mobility’ does exist in the GATS, we will refer to it 
as the movement of migrant workers, not only temporary (as intended in the 
GATS), but also semi-permanent or permanent. According to the GATS, there are 
																																																								
10 Nielsen, Lynge. ‘Classification of Countries Based on Their Level of Development: How it is 
Done and How it Could be Done.’ pdfs.semanticsholar.org. International Monetary Fund 
Working Paper, 2011. Web. Jan. 11, 2018, Page 3. 
11 United Nations. ‘Country Classification.’ www.un.org. World Economic Situations and Prospects 
(WESP), 2014. Web. Jan.11, 2018. 
12 After the definition as outlined in - Opeskin et al. Le droit international de la migration. 
Cowansville : Éditions Yvon Blais, 2014. Print. Page 514. 
13 Virág-Neumann, Ildikó. ‘Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO.’ www.kgk.uni-obuda.hu, 7th  
International Conference on Management, Enterprise and Benchmarking, 2009. Web. Nov. 7, 
2017, Page 383. 
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four modes when it comes to trade in services, Mode 4 being the most interesting 
for this paper. Cole and Guilin sum them up as follows: 
 
‘Mode 1: Cross-border supply – the possibility for non-resident 
service suppliers to supply services cross-border into the Member's 
territory (e.g. bank transfers).  
 
Mode 2: Consumption abroad – the freedom for the Member's 
residents to purchase services in the territory of another Member 
(e.g. tourism).  
 
Mode 3: Commercial presence – the opportunities for foreign service 
suppliers to establish, operate or expand a commercial presence in 
the Member's territory, such as a branch, agency, or wholly owned 
subsidiary (e.g. foreign direct investment).   
 
Mode 4: Presence of natural persons – the entry and temporary stay 




This paper uses the Article 11 definition of the Convention No 143, where a 
migrant worker is ‘a person who migrates or who has migrated from one country to 
another with a view to being employed otherwise than on his own account and 
includes any person regularly admitted as a migrant worker’. This definition 
excludes many workers entering temporarily, such as artists, seamen, and frontier 
workers, among others.15 
Non-migrant foreign workers 
Non-migrant foreign workers are either in the country of destination for a short 
duration for the purpose of seasonal work below three months or are business 
visitors paid in their country of origin. This paper does not focus on such workers.16 
 
																																																								
14 Cole, M.T., and A. Guillin. ‘The determinants of trade agreements in services vs. Goods.’ 
International Economics 144 (2015): 66–82. Science Direct. Web. Jan. 31, 2018, Page 68. 
15 International Labour Organisation (ILO). ‘Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions) 
Convention.’ www.ilo.org. 24 June 1975 C143. Web. Jan. 16, 2018. 
16  United Nations Economic and Social Council. ‘In-depth review of labour mobility and 
globalisation.’ http://www.unece.org, Working Paper ECE/CES/2015/11, 2015. Web. Nov. 7, 
2017. 
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North and South concepts 
When we refer to North and South in this thesis, we use concepts that go 
beyond mere geography. As Kruger puts it: 
‘The terms North and South are used in scientific as well as political 
discourse to describe the relationship between the rich and 
industrialized countries, on the one hand, and the poor, less 
industrialized countries on the other hand. Despite the geographic 
connotation, the dividing line between North and South is not a spatial 
one since several countries from the Southern Hemisphere belong to 
the North and vice versa. Instead, central to the concepts of North and 
South are different economic, political, and social structures, which 
together generate a specific level of development, which can be 
measured using a variety of indicators such as gross domestic product 
(GDP) per head, productivity, unemployment, illiteracy rates, infant 
mortality, life expectancy, and the like.’17 
 
‘Regional’ as used in ‘Regional trade agreements (RTAs)’ 
For the purpose of this paper, regional trade agreements, which we will also 
refer to as ‘multilateral agreements’ and ‘RTAs’, go beyond what is defined by the 
World Trade Organisation (hereafter WTO) as ‘reciprocal trade agreements 
between two or more partners’. They include free trade agreements and customs 
unions.18 In this paper, the author strictly focuses on RTAs with three or more 
partners (plurilateral), and excludes bilateral agreements. One of the reasons for this 
is the overwhelming rate at which bilateral RTAs (also called preferential 
agreements) are being signed. Bilateral agreements have become so widespread and 
accounted for 79% of RTAs notified to the WTO in 2009, and analysing them in 
the course of this paper might bring us astray from the core subject matter of labour 
mobility.19  
 
Moreover, the following discussion on regionalism takes place outside the 
realms of pure international trade law. Fioramonti and Nshimbi also propose a more 
fluid take on regionalism: 
 
																																																								
17 Kruger, L. ‘North-North, North-South and South-South Relations.’ www.eolss.net. Global 
Transformation and World Future, 2008. Web. Nov. 7, 2017, Page 2. 
18 World Trade Organization. ‘Regional Trade Agreements and Preferential Trade Arrangements.’ 
https://www.wto.org, 2017. Web. Jan. 11, 2018. 
19 Jovanovic, Miroslav N. International Handbook on the Economics of Integration : General Issues 
and regional groups. Cheltenham : Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011. Print, Page 9. 
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‘Regionalism is broader than the market-driven concept of regional 
economic integration. However, we use the term regionalism here 
interchangeably with regional economic integration and 
regionalisation to refer to the ideal of the integration of proximate 
states in a given geographical area.’20 
Similarly, the reader should be aware that there are various forms of regional 
integration at play in the international trade systems, such as free trade area, 
customs union, common market, and political integration. 21 However, this paper 
does not focus on the type of trade framework chosen by RTAs but rather on the 
labour market at play in the RTA.22 
Unskilled, low-skilled, skilled workers 
Migration studies routinely separate skilled from unskilled or low-skilled 
workers, but do not set out systematically or precisely the differences among the 
three. At which point does a position move from unskilled to low-skilled to skilled, 
or as proposed by some researchers, low, medium or highly skilled?23 For the 
purpose of this paper, we will approach skilled workers as those workers with a 
completed high school diploma and a form of technical, university or vocational 
training, and unskilled and low-skilled will be used as synonyms.24 
2.3.  A note on excluded agreements and common markets 
 
Many labour agreements that facilitate global mobility do exist beyond this 
study in the form of bilateral agreements but have been purposely excluded to focus 
on multilateral agreements, as stated above. As of 2010, a massive 462 RTAs had 
been notified to the WTO and as of 2014, that number had increased to 511.25 
However, most of these RTAs do not have labour mobility programmes.26 Indeed, 
																																																								
20 Fioramonti, Lorenzo and Chris Nshimbi. Regional Migration Governance in the African 
Continent. Current State of Affairs and the Way Forward. First Edition. Bonn: Stiftung 
Entwicklung und Frieden, 2016. http://www.sef-bonn.org. Web. Jan. 15, 2018, Page 14. 
21 Vicard, Vincent. ‘Trade, conflict, and political integration: Explaining the heterogeneity of 
regional trade agreements.’ European Economic Review 56 (2012): 54–71. Science Direct. Web. 
Jan. 31, 2018, Page 55. 
22 Vicard, Vincent. Ibid, Note 21, Page 55. 
23 El Mouhoub,  Mouhoud. Ibid, Note 6. Page 133.  
24 Ruhs, Martin. The Price of Rights. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013. Print, Chapter 4. 
25 Reyes et al. ‘Regional Agreements and the Pattern of Trade : A Networks Approach.’ The World 
Economy 37.8 (2014): 1128-1151. Wiley Online. Web. Feb. 1, 2018, Note 1. 
26 Lewis, MK. ‘The Prisoners' Dilemma Posed by Free Trade Agreements: Can Open Access 
Provisions Provide an Escape?’ Chicago Journal of International Law 11.2 (2011): 632-661 
University of Chicago Online. Web. Nov. 7, 2017, Page 638. 
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in 2011, Van Grassek reported that only 27,9% of RTAs notified to the WTO 
covered both goods and services.27 Out of these, this paper only focuses on those 
RTAs that go beyond the GATS commitments. 
 
2.4.  Disclaimer 
 
RTAs are highly political and ever-changing, especially in an age where 
there seems to be an ongoing fight between globalisation and protectionism. We 
foresee that our analysis could quickly become outdated especially our discussion 
on NAFTA, which, at the time of submission, was a regional agreement in 
jeopardy. However, the debate on the facilitation of labour mobility could persist 
for many years to come, despite the challenge of the literature on RTAs not 
‘keeping the pace’ with their multiplication.28 
 
Though data from academic papers may be invoked from time to time, we 
must highlight that the following paper is not an empirical study. Social scientists 
from all sectors have tried to draw clear correlations between the influx of migrant 
workers and various consequences on the economy with regard to employment but, 
given the difficulty in accessing data and the transnational nature of migration, we 
prefer to conduct a framework analysis.29 The problem of conclusive data on 
migration, outlined further below in Section 4.2, also invites us to take the numbers 
and dates in the following paper with a pinch of salt, as most of them are 
intertwined with ever-changing policies, which academics and practitioners alike 
have trouble monitoring. 
 
Similarly, given imperatives to present a succinct exposé, fellow readers 
will undoubtedly question the conclusions and findings of this paper or deem them 
reductive. However, we take the position that, though empirically imperfect, 
research and discussions on international mobility should not refrain from 
commenting on patterns taking shape despite the handicap of insufficient data.  
																																																								
27 Van Grasstek, C. The Political Economy of Services in Regional Trade Agreements - OECD 
Trade Policy Papers, No. 112. Paris: OECD Publishing, 2011. Print. Page 31. 
28 Froese, Marc D. ‘Regional Trade Agreements and the Paradox of Dispute Settlement.’ 
Manchester Journal of International Economic Law 11.3 (2014): 367-396. Hein Online. Web. 
Feb. 2, 2018, Page 367. 
29 Joint Paper (ILO, OECD, World Bank). ‘The Contribution of Labour Mobility to Economic 
Growth.’ www.ilo.org, 2015. Web. Nov. 7, 2017, Page 86. 
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3.  REGIONAL AGREEMENTS WITH LABOUR MOBILITY 
 
3.1  Introductory comments 
 
Labour mobility is first a phenomenon that occurs regardless of the 
involvement of the state. Individuals are free to make arrangements to try and work 
in a foreign country and do so routinely, to a point where the influx of workers 
often creates a massive diaspora within the host country, as is the case for Malays 
in Indonesia and Haitians in the Dominican Republic.30 Some may be surprised that 
international migration accounts only for roughly 3 per cent of the world 
population, a modest number, and is not as widespread as headlines may suggest.31 
However, it is common knowledge that there is no universal right of entry to a 
foreign country, and therefore, all regular movement of workers usually involves 
another state’s policy allowing the entry. 
 
This paper is interested in initiatives by states to facilitate the influx of 
foreign workers specifically by way of regional trade agreements. So far, most of 
the multilateral agreements with effective labour mobility provisions have been 
organised by regions within continents and we will examine them as such.  
 
3.2.  Africa 
 
Africa is a particularly interesting continent given the proliferation of 
regional trade agreements that are ongoing, amidst talks to create a continent-wide 
trade zone, the Continental Free Trade Agreement (CFTA).32 According to Geda 
and Seid, this popularity of RTAs in the continent is unsurprising: 
 
‘This proliferation of RECs partly indicates that the issue of regional 
integration is very crucial for African countries.1 This is not surprising 
given that about 35% of the population and one third of the economies 
in the continent are trapped as landlocked countries whose trade and 
development depend on what happens in their coastal neighbors. In 
																																																								
30 International Labour Organisation (ILO). ‘International Labour Conference: Towards a fair deal 
for migrant workers in the global economy.’ www.ilo.org, 2004. Web. Nov. 7, 2017, Page 5. 
31 Opeskin et al. Ibid, Note 12, Page 377. 
32 African Union. ‘CFTA-Continental Free Trade Area.’ https://au.int, 2017. Web. Nov. 7, 2017. 
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addition, most countries in Africa are small and hence their economic 
feasibility and global bargaining position individually are highly 
limited.’33 
 
Among the most renowned agreements is the East African Community 
(EAC), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), but both have 
failed to set the free movement of labour (and even the full movement of visitors) 
in motion. The EAC has proclaimed it on paper but recent studies show that the 
protocol for the free movement of workers has yet to be fully implemented and 
faces barriers such as discretionary executive blockages.34 The same applies to the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), which is the largest 
regional trade agreement on the continent, but it has not facilitated the movement of 
workers.35 
 
Consequently, the only African agreement facilitating labour mobility is the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The collective territory 
of ECOWAS, formerly known as West Africa under colonization rule, has its 
origins in the creation of the CFA franc in 1945, a common currency for French-
speaking West African countries, to create a monetary union between four states in 
the turn of 1964 and 1965.36 A proposition to unite the area more globally was 
made official in 1975, with the signature of the Treaty of Lagos.37 Labour mobility 
is based on the Protocol relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and 
Establishment of the ECOWAS. It was also followed by a Protocol of Non-
Aggression (1978) and a Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence Pact 
(1981), along with provisions on security coordination (including a ban on the entry 
of new weapons without other states’ approval), and permanent structures of 
conflict management.38  
 
																																																								
33 Geda, Alemayu and Edriss Hussein Seid. ‘The potential for internal trade and regional integration 
in Africa.’ Journal of African Trade 2 (2015): 19–50. Science Direct. Web. Jan. 31, 2018, Page 
20. 
34 Christopher Nshimbi and Lorenzo Fioramonti. Ibid, Note 20, Page 9. 
35 Christopher Nshimbi and Lorenzo Fioramonti. Ibid, Note 20, Page 15.  
36 ECOWAS. ‘Economic Community of the  West African States – History.’www.ecowas.int, 2016. 
Web. Feb. 3, 2017. 
37 ECOWAS. ‘Protocol Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment.’ 
documentation.ecowas.int, A/P 1/5/7929, May 1979. Web. Jan. 15, 2018. 
38 Powell, Joseph and Trisha Low. ‘African Regional Trade Agreements as Flexible Legal Regimes; 
Is the WTO Quietly Fading Away?: The New Regionalism and Global Trade Rules.’ The 
Georgetown Journal of Law Public Policy 9 (2011): 261-282, Pages 267, 268. 
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Today, it is signed by fifteen nations, which altogether constitute a 
population of above 300 million people, and 7.5 million West Africans are now 
internal migrants within the ECOWAS zone.39. An additional protocol aiming at 
supporting the flexibility of the common market and improving the rights of foreign 
workers has been introduced but not properly implemented.40 Quayson and Arhind 
argue that it is hindered by ‘the ineffective application of the law, economic 
failings, competing political priorities among member states, national sovereignty 
and non-ratification of additional protocols.’41  
 
Despite these failings, West Africa has taken the lead in labour mobility in 
Africa, with the creation of ‘ECOWAS citizens’ (as displayed on their passport) 
who can now work and start a business freely within the region and, as author 
Kristina Tounezis puts it, have ‘embraced’ cultural integration’.42 She argues that 
the good functionality of the agreement is thanks to Article 27 of the ECOWAS 
Treaty of 1975. This article affirms that member states among the ECOWAS shall 
be ‘regarded as Community citizens and accordingly Member states undertake to 
abolish all obstacles to their freedom of movement and residence’ and be ‘[allowed] 
to work and undertake commercial and industrial activities’.43 The right to work in 
another member country was formalised in 1992, shortly after the introduction of 
regional residency cards (1990) and the adoption of uniform immigration and 
emigration forms.44 
 
This RTA rests on the premise that the integration of West African countries 
can generate economic, cultural and social cohesion in the region.45 Moreover, the 
ECOWAS member countries have agreed on a Convention on Social Security, have 
ratified the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, and most 
																																																								
39 ECOWAS, ‘Economic Community of the  West African States – History’, Ibid, Note 36. 
40 Changwe Nshimbi, Christopher and Lorenzo Fioramonti. ‘A region without borders? Policy 
frameworks for regional labour migration towards South Africa.’ www.miworc.co.za, 2013. Web. 
Nov. 7, 2017, Page 45. 
41 Quayson, Ato and Antonela Arhin. Labour Migration, Human Trafficking and Multinational 
Corporations. London : Routledge, 2012. Print, Section 6.1.  
42 Touzenis, Kristina. Free Movement of persons in the European Union and Economic Community 
of if West African States: a comparison of law and practice. Paris: UNESCO, 2012. Print.  Page 7. 
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importantly, the United Nations (hereafter UN) Resolution No 60/277 on 
International Migration and Development and the International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers.46 
 
Observers argue that ECOWAS has been a successful endeavour so far, but 
has also caused negative ancillary effects, such as an increase in human trafficking 
in the region, of HIV prevalence and in illegal crossings to Europe.47 Indeed, 
deserving ECOWAS citizens are often not able to enjoy the privileges of the 
Agreement due to trouble in securing official identity documents or, at times, to 
their ignorance of the availability of the programme in the first place.48 Joshua 
Olusegun Bolarinwa further adds that ECOWAS states have unequal economies 
and political regimes, some of which are too weak to quickly absorb legislative 
changes at the national level, which has resulted in unjust deportations and 
abuses.49  
 
Human trafficking is especially pervasive in West Africa and political 
leaders have adopted a plan of action on this issue specifically, though it appears 
unsuccessful to date due to the ‘low level of commitment of some countries, 
sporadic and uncoordinated actions, lack of adequate data and technical incapacity 
for surveillance and tracking down of traffickers.’50 Aderanti Adepoju further adds 
that there are problems with unequal currencies and imbalance of powers between 
economic giants Nigeria and Ivory Coast with other ECOWAS members.51 To 
tackle this, another interesting development among the ECOWAS is a Protocol 
Relating to the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development of the 
Economic Community of West African States. This Protocol calls to compensate 
ECOWAS implementation costs for financially strained Member states, and to 
promote financing and development projects of ‘less developed’ state members.52 
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   Joshua Olusegun Bolawinra issues a series of recommendations for a more 
functional ECOWAS, that are also relevant for our analysis of labour mobility 
schemes as a whole, including harmonising domestic laws with the treaty and sub-
regional treaties, identifying ways to improve the speed of custom formalities and 
the access to information on the protocols and to the ECOWAS passport.53 Indeed, 
Geda and Seid highlight problems of high transaction costs in ECOWAS borders 
due to poor bureaucratic infrastructure and administrative delays.54 Given all the 
elements that remain to be tweaked to make ECOWAS truly work, he believes that 
West Africa is not ready for the free movement of people at its current stage of 
development.55  Nonetheless, ready or not, the West African region, as of 2005, 
held the highest share of internal migrants, sitting at 50 per cent of the 
population.56 
 
     Moreover, despite these challenges, the ECOWAS Protocol on Free 
Movement has helped to facilitate (and set the precedent for) a labour migration 
system in West Africa (and the whole of Africa, for that matter).57 This is a 
tremendous achievement in and of itself. Moreover, not all authors agree that, at 
least in the African context, this apparent lack of structure is a bad thing. Indeed, 
according to James Thuo Gathii, African economies are aware of their limits in 
terms of development, and therefore the flexible RTA schemes, though different 
from traditional trade models, might be more adapted to their reality. Similarly, 
some of these RTAs have embraced compensatory mechanisms among the 
alliance, an indirect way of rejecting the non-discrimination principle of the 
GATS.58 He sums up the whole African experience with RTAs in these eloquent 
terms: 
 
‘Viewing African RTAs as flexible regimes has the advantage of 
allowing these RTAs to be understood on their own terms, rather 
than as treaty regimes on a path toward becoming much like the 
European or North American counterparts. In so doing, it becomes 
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possible to better and more accurately understand the challenges that 
these RTAs have been designed to address and that have in turn 
shaped them. As Tiyanhana Maluwa has argued, African countries 
have preferred informal institutions to the “bureaucratic strictures 
and international rule-making legislative processes of formal 
international institutions.”’59 
 
3.3.  Asia 
 
The key regional trade agreement with labour mobility provisions in Asia is 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (hereafter ASEAN). It was initiated by 
five countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) with the 
Bangkok Declaration of 1967 establishing an Association for Regional Cooperation 
and solemnised in 1976 by the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast 
Asia.60 Beyond cultural and economic cooperation, this association also aimed at 
‘the collective will of the nations of Southeast Asia to bind themselves together in 
friendship and cooperation and, through joint efforts and sacrifices, secure for their 
peoples and for posterity the blessings of peace, freedom and prosperity.’61 The 
association also stated that other countries of the Southeast Asian region were free 
to join. The evolution of this agreement was made possible by the creation of a free 
trade area (the Asian Free Trade Area: AFTA), through the 2009 ASEAN Free 
Trade in Goods Agreement and an annual forum with ASEAN leaders.62 It now 
gathers ten member countries.63 
 
When it comes to services, it is the 1995 Framework Agreement of Trade in 
Services modelled after the GATS and focused on skilled workers that still rules the 
present day situation.64 ASEAN, also referred to as the AEC (ASEAN Economic 
Community), will soon encompass 600 million residents and 285 million workers 
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in the ten ASEAN member states.65 The AEC regroups Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. 
It is regarded as the most successful agreement of the Asian region.66 The speedy 
evolution of ASEAN is characteristic of a blossoming Asia-Pacific region, which 
entered 80% of RTAs (in terms of goods or services) after 2001.67 
Over its first 15 years of existence up to 2013, the ASEAN created a pool of 
1.7 million to 6.5 million (possibly more) internal migrants, and could dethrone 
Europe as the region with the most migrants.68 Though the pool of outbound 
workers is for the most part low-skilled, a report from the Migrating for Work 
Research Consortium estimates that this may be a positive thing in the Asian 
context: for instance, to populate rural areas and to support enlarged Asian 
economies.69 However, and this is part of the paradox, ASEAN has formalised 
skilled worker mobility but not unskilled workers’ mobility. This choice was 
criticised Pranoto Iskander and Nicola Piper in a recent paper. They state: 
‘Burying the reality of low-skilled migration under the carpet is both 
jeopardizing for the project of regionalism in the long run and 
morally deplorable at the same time. Nevertheless, should ASEAN 
be serious with progressing to shift away from pure elitism, it makes 
sense now to start treating this population as one of the important 
facets of the regional project.’70 
Nonetheless, it appears that low-skilled workers migration is happening in practice 
anyhow through the ASEAN and somewhat legally, depending on the unilateral 
policy chosen by the host state.71  
The ASEAN members have been committed to establishing a structural 
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framework in their endeavours, not so far removed from the GATS model.72 They 
have also signed an intra-ASEAN Memorandum of Understanding to improve 
immigration proceedings, requirements and duration of stays among the ASEAN.73 
Through the years, the emerging ASEAN law and more than 313 treaties signed 
within the ASEAN gave birth to the 2008 ASEAN Charter. This Charter has been 
implemented in the members’ jurisdictions.74  
  Despite these impressive developments in a short amount of time, attempts 
of both the Thai and Malay governments (popular inbound destinations) have 
failed to protect migrant workers, either because of restrictive barriers to mobility 
but also due to difficulty securing identity documents, as in the ECOWAS 
experience. The Thai government eventually resorted to amnesties for 
undocumented workers at numerous times over the years, but nonetheless, most 
could not legitimise their status due to the impossibility of verifying their 
nationality.75  Malaysia reports more success in regularising irregular migrant 
workers, with declared workers going from 242 000 in 1990 to 1.9 million in 2008, 
though up to another million may still be in an irregular situation. Reasons for the 
perpetuation of the problem are attributed to porous borders and the shared history 
between neighbouring Asian countries.76 These problems of identity verification 
have resulted in perpetuating illegality in the ASEAN region despite the premise 
that at least skilled citizens of member states are entitled to work in a fellow 
member state country. In other cases, such as the one of workers from Myanmar in 
Thailand, pending identity verification barred many from work insurance and 
social security benefits.77 
 
   Moreover, the ASEAN member countries are determined to improve the 
domestic implementation of ASEAN legislation and directives and to follow suit 
with international labour migration standards through instruments such as the 
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International Labour Organisation (hereafter ILO) Conventions. In a report from 
the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council, there are indeed problems in 
recruitment procedures and a culture of impunity of employers that must be 
corrected in the ASEAN.78 To tackle this issue, a Declaration on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Rights of Migrant Workers was adopted in 2007 by ASEAN 
countries, and a committee to monitor its enforcement was established; a novelty in 
a region where human and labour rights are not as prominent as in other 
jurisdictions.79 
 
   Despite these challenges, ASEAN concludes to the benefits of further 
facilitating labour mobility, and appears serious about improving the movement of 
foreign workers, including unskilled workers.80 Speaking of Asia as a whole, a 
publication by the Asian Development Bank Institute, however, notes the difficulty 
in matching supply and demand. 81  Other reports highlight that, beyond a 
commitment to improve unskilled migrations, there are still barriers to the mere 
movement of ASEAN citizens because some ASEAN countries often enter more 
generous partnerships with other countries than their fellow ASEAN member 
states.82 There is therefore a great need to improve access of unskilled workers to 
the programme, access to documentation, and the rights of workers before massive 
irregular migrations from Myanmar and Laos, for instance, can truly be tackled.83 
 
   The ASEAN experience, involving the most populous RTA of the 
developing world, is of high interest for further research. Deeper integration efforts 
have been estimated to possibly yield a 5.3% growth among member states, though 
the magnitude of the integration effort is ‘comparable in scale and difficulty to that 
of European integration.’84 
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3.4.  Europe 
 
The European continent’s most famous mobility programme is undoubtedly 
the European Union (hereafter EU). Europe progressively moved from customs to 
political union as a way to ‘foster common interests among the major European 
powers in order to prevent the outbreak of a new war among them, and to band 
together in the face of the threat of possible war with the Soviet Union.’85 In 
parallel to the EU, Scandinavian countries have also set in motion their own 
agreement, the Common Nordic Labour Market, which unites Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway and Sweden. This agreement allows Nordic citizens to live and 
work within the countries of the signatories. Given the similarities between this 
agreement and the European Union, at least in terms of labour mobility, which is 
straightforward in both, we will focus on the EU.86 
 
The EU is probably the best-known regional trade agreement facilitating 
mobility and is also one of the oldest and most integrated ones, with the Rome 
Treaty establishing the EU common market dating as far back as 1957 and a 
European Parliament that EU citizens can elect directly from 1979 onward.87 In 
1973, when three more countries (Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom) 
joined in, followed by Greece in 198188. 
 
In its own way, the EU was a visionary when it comes to the free movement 
of workers, enabling the four freedoms for the movement of money, people, goods 
and services made official in 1993 with the creation of a single market via the 
Maastricht Treaty on European Union.89 This free movement of workers is now 
formally encompassed in Section 39 of the Treaty of Nice (2003) and by the 
creation of the borderless Schengen zone beyond the EU itself, now comprising 27 
states. 90 The European Union has the most advanced labour market among regional 
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trade agreements.91 Though previous years have shown the problems associated 
with the absence of a common policy on migration outside the EU and the existence 
of many detractors, it is seen overall as a major achievement and successful 
integration effort.92  
 
Interestingly enough, migration within the EU has been lower than 
expected.93 There is a phenomenon of stagnation in the movement of internal 
migration though, possibly due to different financial and labour conditions. Indeed, 
migrant workers within the EU account for 3.6 per cent of the labour force, a rather 
modest number.94 Indeed, an assessment by Yves Pascouaou deems that labour 
mobility within the EU reduced employment inequality and labour shortages, 
increased competitiveness and job opportunities and has helped to develop a shared 
identity. However, he argues that the intra-EU mobility remains (too) low.95 This 
may be due to language differences, certainly an impediment despite the skill set of 
the prospective immigrant.96 
 
Many detractors of the European Union also point to adverse effects on the 
labour market created by competition for low-skilled work, to which a study from 
Harvard University responds with the following observations, which are also 
relevant at the international level: 
  
‘The likelihood and magnitude of adverse labour market effects for 
natives from immigration are substantially weaker than often 
perceived. Within the large empirical literature looking at the effects 
of immigration on native employment and wages, most studies find 
only minor displacement effects even after large immigrant flows. On 
the other hand, some more recent studies have found larger effects, 
and many studies note that the negative effects are concentrated on 
certain parts of the native population. The parts of the population most 
typically affected are the less-educated natives or the earlier 
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immigrant cohort that is, those who are the closest substitutes to the 
new immigrant now currently experienced by Europe.’ 97 
 
Moreover, Europe is recovering from an economic crisis that had the 
consequence of creating migrants (including fellow Europeans) as scapegoats and 
gave rise to a negative political climate, despite immigrants being the primary 
victims of the economic crisis.98 This negative political climate is an inevitable 
manifestation of an inefficient international framework on labour mobility. In this 
regard, Stephen Kim Park has enlightening words: 
‘This global institutional vacuum comes at a significant cost. As the 
European migration crisis shows, countries may be increasingly ill-
equipped to deal with influx of migrants that threaten to overwhelm 
border controls and domestic political systems.’99 
 
As of 2007, EU countries have adopted several key directives and 
regulations on the theme of migration, but most of them are limited to general 
principles to leave as much sovereignty as possible to EU members to regulate this 
delicate matter. Consequently, even before the whirlwind of previous years 
following a sharp rise in migrations to Europe, Maxime Tandonnet had already 
noted a duality between ‘the left hand handing powers to Europe and the right hand 
taking them away in a permanent and schizophrenic-like game’ when it comes to 
regulating immigration in Europe.100  
 
3.5.  North America 
The most important regional trade agreement for labour mobility in North 
America is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), entered in 1994 
between the United States, Canada and Mexico and echoing the 1988 Canada-
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United States Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA).101 The CUFTA preceded the GATS 
and set a significant precedent in the international mobility system for better or 
worse, as ‘it is not a customs union and avoids any hint of supranationality’.102   
NAFTA’s primary goal was to fuel trade in goods exchanged between the three 
countries – and indeed they have more than quadrupled to US$ 350 billion in less 
than ten years between Mexico and the US. Mexican manufactured goods exported 
to Canada and the US also multiplied by 16. However, irregular migration has also 
been on the rise, though this may be more attributable to the rising US economy as 
the Mexican economy was dipping.103 
 
NAFTA also facilitates the flow of business workers by eliminating 
exhaustive labour certifications, quotas and by harmonising the immigration 
procedures, all in a system exceeding the GATS Mode 4.104 This agreement 
preceded the entry into force of the GATS and consequently has an unusually 
narrow framework, with targeted jobs limited to four skill categories (business 
visitors, traders and investors, intra-company transferees and professionals) and in 
which the workers are expected to engage only temporarily. 105 NAFTA has what 
has been described as ‘the most elaborate labour provisions’, with the North 
American Agreement on Labour Cooperation calling for ‘high standards’, though 
no definition of what ‘high’ means is outlined in the Agreement.106 
 
The programme is popular with Canadian and Mexican professionals 
coming into the United States with job offers. Numbers speak for themselves as to 
its popularity, with NAFTA visa (TN visas in the United States) holders rising from 
85 142 in the US territory in 2007 to 899 455 in 2011.107 Initially, the US had set a 
maximum quota of Mexican NAFTA workers at 5 500, though it was uncapped in 
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2004.108 Canadian analysts have attempted to explain why the movements of 
workers appear to be primarily to the United States and ‘career development 
opportunities’ and ‘intra-corporate transfers related to trade and investment 
adjustments’ were found to be the major reasons for Canadian professionals 
moving south across the border.  
 
The NAFTA programme is tightly governed by the issuance of visas with 
fixed duration and the processing on the United States’ side is different depending 
on whether the applicants are from Canada or Mexico.109 This has led observers to 
conclude that RTAs operating in such a way are often discriminatory.110 Moreover, 
though TN-visa holders from both Canada and Mexico have risen over the years, 
many impediments restrict the functionality of NAFTA when it comes to labour 
mobility.111 For instance, spouses and children of TN-visa holders do not have the 
right to work in the United States, while United States residents or citizens do not 
face the same restrictions in Canada and Mexico.112 The NAFTA agreement is 
therefore both discriminatory and non-reciprocal.  
 
However, NAFTA does have another innovative component beyond its 
North-South nature, and that is a ‘ground-breaking’ compulsory procedure of 
dispute settlement. This system, entrenched in Chapter 20 of the Agreement, was 
overshadowed through the years with the adoption of the Dispute Settlement 
Understanding of the WTO.113 On another angle, this use of the WTO as an 
overreaching body above the RTA that is NAFTA is an interesting precedent for 
pushing the superior rank of the WTO in the legislative hierarchy on labour 
mobility – as discussed further in Section 5. 
 
NAFTA is one of the rare multilateral regional agreements in a North-South 
partnership on labour mobility, and some have assessed that it generated growth 
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and development for Mexico but not in terms of job creation and wages.114 
Moreover, the post 9/11 era has greatly affected the feasibility of the agreement, 
with trade infringed by concerns of millions of Mexican workers entering the 
United States of America illegally and the enactment of various laws with regards 
to border control that have substantially reduced trade and travels between was 
initially were tres amigos.115  Bélanger points to ‘regional asymmetry of power, 
deeply ingrained attitudes towards sovereignty and idiosyncratic treaty-making 
practices’ as other aggravating factors.116 Its future is uncertain at the time of 
writing and in terms of labour mobility, it is far from an advanced framework, as 
opposed to its provisions regarding trade in goods.117  
 
3.6.  Central and South America 
 
Central and South America are interesting laboratories for regional trade 
agreements on labour mobility but the Caribbean Community and Common Market 
(hereafter CARICOM) and Mercado Comun del Cono Sur (Southern Cone 
Common Market) (hereafter MERCOSUR) have led the most promising efforts on 
trade in services. Other agreements such as Dominican Republic-Central America 
FTA (DR-CAFTA) and the Andean Community also seem willing to perfect and 
establish a system for themselves but, like many others, only provide for visa-free 
travels, not visa-free work permits. It is worth mentioning that the Central and 
South America region is characterized by a myriad of custom unions, bilateral 
agreements, free trade agreements – most of which, however, do not cover services. 
For instance, Chile alone has fourteen free trade agreements and 45 preferential 
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  The Caribbean Community was established by the Treaty of Chaguaramas 
(1973) and further strengthened by forming a common market in the course of the 
Declaration of Grand Anse (1989).119  The common market included thirteen initial 
signatories that were former British colonies, with Suriname and Haiti joining in 
afterwards. 120  CARICOM also ratified a ‘Revised Treaty Establishing the 
Caribbean Community Including the Caricom Single Market and Economy’ in 
2001, which came into effect in 2006.121 CARICOM has its own Protocol for the 
flow of skilled workers (specifically) since 1998 and has an interesting additional 
feature compared to other RTAs, which is the principle of national treatment of 
workers (but ‘providing no restriction is made by the state party’).122 However, the 
implementation of this protocol has not been completed since 1973.123  
 
CARICOM members share a common passport since 2005.124 Additionally, 
and despite the regional deficit of CARICOM, the region has established the 
Caribbean Court of Justice acting as a supreme authority for trade disputes among 
the community in 2005, has adopted common standards and also established a 
Competition Commission (2008).125 To ease the movement of workers in the 
community, CARICOM also adopted an Agreement on Social Security that took 
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Despite this impressive regional system of governance, in her overview of 
the progress of CARICOM, Karen E. Bravo concludes that ‘commitments to labour 
liberalization have been limited to a small subset of CARICOM nationals.’127 
Indeed, the evolution of CARICOM’s mobility programme started with the initial 
freedom of movement of five types of workers only in 1996 (on paper but not in 
practice): namely, university graduates, media workers, artists, musicians, athletes 
and professionals. This privilege was also extended to nurses, domestic aides and 
teachers in 2006, and artisans, university graduates and domestic workers (aides) in 
2007 to 2009, though some countries have suspended the implementation.128 All in 
all, the Protocol II, which was supposed to set up free movement for these 
professions and transform CARICOM into a custom’s union, is still not in force and 
the information on what is or is not permitted is conflicting for the researcher – one 
can therefore only imagine for the citizen.129 
 
CARICOM also has an additional procedural requirement that can be a 
little cumbersome. A Certificate of Recognition of CARICOM skills qualification 
must be obtained from the domestic labour ministry, and upon arrival in another 
CARICOM country, only a six-month permit will be issued until credentials 
verification is conducted by the home country’s labour ministry, a verification 
request that must be presented upon arrival.130 Though some could argue that a 
more rigid structure is in line with global trade rules, according to Derek O’Brien, 
this is not a sustainable modus operandi in the long run because sooner or later, 
member states of CARICOM will have to relinquish further sovereignty for the 
union to evolve.131 In another legal studies on CARICOM, the author notes the 
remaining vulnerability of the system due to lack of diversification among the 
market, though, as in most studies, such comments are geared towards goods rather 
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than services.132 Other issues highlighted in academic work are the difficulty to 
harmonise legislation given the diversity of legal traditions within the union, and 
the need for uniform tax policy and currency.133 
All in all, despite the novelty and potential interest for CARICOM citizens 
to have a mobility programme available, only 9000 individuals (out of the regional 
population of 18 million people) had secured the ‘attestation of competency’ in 
2010.134 
MERCOSUR 
Another ongoing trade agreement and common market with labour 
mobility provisions in South America is the Mercado Comun Del Sur 
(MERCOSUR). Established in 1991 by the Treaty of Asunción between Argentina, 
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, MERCOSUR also welcomed new state members, 
namely Bolivia (1996), Peru (2003) and Colombia and Ecuador (2004).135 It started 
off as a common market and progressively added migration programmes, which 
took place only in the 2000s.136 It represents over US$ 1000 billion in GDPs 
combined and more than 210 million residents and is one of the strongest trading 
blocks after NAFTA and the EU.137  
A report from the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants 
concluded that MERCOSUR has enhanced economic and cultural integration along 
																																																								
132 McLean, Sheldon and Jeetendra Khadan. ‘An assessment of the performance of CARICOM 
extraregional trade agreement.’ repositoria.cepal.org, Eclac Subregional Headquarters for the 
Caribbean, 2015. Web. Jan. 12, 2018, Page 10. 
133 Malcoms, Christopher P. ‘Caribbean Integration Within the CARICOM Framework: The Socio-
historical, Economic, and Political Dynamics of a Regional Response to a Global Phenomenon.’ 
Law and Business Review of the Americas 10 (2004): 35-64, Page 58. 
134 Opeskin et al. Ibid, Note 12, Page 400. 
135 MERCOSUR. ‘Treaty establishing a Common Market (Asunción Treaty) between the Argentine 
Republic, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic 
of Uruguay.’ www.wipo.int, Asuncion: Paraguay, 26 March 1991. Web. Jan. 15, 2018; Baer, 
Werner et al., ‘Economic Integration without Policy Coordination; the case of MERCOSUR’, 
Emerging Markets Review 3 (2002): 269-291. Science Direct Online. Web. Nov. 9, 2017, Page 
271. 
136 Opeskin et al. Ibid, Note 12, Page 448. 
137 Santander, Sebastian. ‘The European Partnership with Mercosur: a Relationship Based on 
Strategic and Neo–liberal Principles.’ Journal of European Integration 27.3 (2005): 285-306. 
Taylor and Francis Online. Web. Jan. 14, 2018, Page 291. 
	 32 
with social security among the union. 138  Another report also sums up this 
achievement: 
 
‘MERCOSUR has turned an area of low mutual confidence and 
historical rivalries into an area where inter-state violence has been ruled 
out, international cooperation has become the norm and high-tension 
controversies have ceased to exist.’139 
 
 
   In terms of numbers, the first seven years of the MERCOSUR tripled intra-
regional trade and the increase was shown in trade creation, which is even more 
‘remarkable’ than trade diversion. 140  On the other hand, disparities in 
macroeconomic policies, such as failure to coordinate exchange rates among the 
MERCOSUR countries have caused price fluctuations that have negatively 
affected trade benefits.141  Indeed, through the years, MERCOSUR went through 
many challenges. Firstly, Coffey draws similarities between the power imbalance 
of France and Germany in the EU with Argentina and Brazil in MERCOSUR, who 
also happen to be the first beneficiaries of the intra-MERCOSUR trade.142 As 
‘increasing divergence in the economic and political aims’ of some countries rose, 
various countries manipulated their tariffs at the regional level as forms of anti-
dumping measures. 
 
    Once the heat of an initial tense period in which Argentina underwent an 
economic crisis (1999) was over, there was a shift of mentality to reinforce 
integration. There was a push for more implementation of the MERCOSUR 
legislation, for more economic fiscal policy coordination and to promote trade in 
the region in the form of infrastructure building. 143 However, this push was put to 
the test again, with an economic crisis in Brazil this time in the mid-2000s.144 All 
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in all, years onward, these problems of coordination due to ‘”extremely weak” 
institutional structures’ and ‘the desire of members states to maintain national 
control over the integration process’ are still pervasive issues in MERCOSUR.145 
To tackle this problem, a Permanent Review Tribunal (the Tribunal Permanente de 
Revision) was established to rule on MERCOSUR interpretation issues, though no 
right of individual petition is available to seize it.146 Nonetheless, according to 
Laura Gomez-Mera, MERCOSUR still routinely struggles with diplomatic 
conflicts, making it a ‘”fractious” and “unsteady” political alliance’.147 
 
   However, this capacity of resilience of MERCOSUR may set an example 
for other RTAs, according to Mahruck Doctor: 
 
‘Given the current crisis in the Euro-zone area, the Mercosur  case, 
with its demonstrated ability to survive crises, has added relevance. 
The EU crisis has highlighted issues related to the continued 
preference for inter-governmentalism to preserve national autonomy, 
and exposed the weak character of supra-national instutitons  and the 




Trade in services was formalized and facilitated in 1997 with the Protocol 
on Services of Montevideo, with a list of service sector commitments inspired by 
the GATS.149 MERCOSUR also established the Working Group No 10 gathering 
labour ministers officers, employers and unions to coordinate employment and 
labour issues arising from the integration of labour forces. 150  Since then, 
MERCOSUR has adopted a shared passport, along with a regional Parliament, 
Secretariat and Court of Appeal.151 MERCOSUR also has a superior authority, the 
MERCOSUR Council, and decision-making bodies in the form of the Trade 
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Commissions and MERCOSUR Group.152 Nowadays, the MERCOSUR regime is 
especially generous, with the MERCOSUR visa allowing free movement along 
with the right to provide services for a period of four years. Treatment no less 
favourable is also guaranteed among citizens of the MERCOSUR.153 
 
   However, the MERCOSUR also has its own share of troubles in ensuring 
the respect of human rights of migrant workers. The relocation of 350 000 
Paraguayans along with 250 000 Bolivians in Argentina did not go unnoticed, and 
their activity in the informal economy led to xenophobic sentiments, another side 
effect of mismanagement in migration.154 To cater to this problem, the member 
countries adopted the Santiago Declaration on Migration Principles (2004) and 
have conducted the MERCOUR Specialized Forum on migration since 2003 with a 
focus on capacity building, consultation, and information exchange – all on the 
topic of migration within MERCOSUR.155 There is also active promotion to 
facilitate the recognition of diplomas and to integrate fellow MERCOSUR 
professionals as a result.156  
 
4.  COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
4.1.  Introductory comments  
 
   Comparing regional trade agreements is a bold endeavour, especially given 
the limited empirical data to document migration, and the uniqueness of each 
regional agreement. While most of them have made substantial achievements, 
Karen E. Bravo nonetheless concluded in 2008 that apart from the European 
Union, these RTAs are, overall, failed attempts at true labour liberalisation and 
rather timid and ‘half-hearted’ executions. 157  The ILO hypothesises that the 
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reasons for this generally include any or all of the following: ‘a lack of national 
implementing legislation, administrative barriers, or apparent absence of political 
will.’158 What can be said a few years on, as we dive into 2018? 
 




The European Union has been praised as one of the most successful RTAs 
but it also happens to have an efficient, centralised, hierarchically superior and 
well-financed supervision structure. Other RTAs such as ECOWAS and ASEAN, 
despite their best intentions, have member countries that still have difficulty 
guaranteeing access to identity documents for all their citizens. Interestingly 
enough, the problem of identity verification, which goes hand in hand with border 
control, is often forgotten amidst all the noise about securitisation.159  
 
This focus on irregular migration fails to grasp this important duality. As 
Taran and Geronimi highlight: 
‘The predominance given to migration control in many forums is both 
root and reflection of fundamental impediments to rationally and 
effectively addressing international migration. Migration, regular and 
irregular, has, does and will continue to exist as inexorably as 
economic forces at work in a globalized economy. The international 
community —sometimes reluctantly— acknowledges the need to 
manage and regulate movements of capital, goods, technology, 
services, information, etc., whether through formal means or “market 
mechanisms”’.160 
Governmental fragmentation as a culprit 
The management of migration is often a competency shared between the 
labour and protection ministries, which is first cause of legal fragmentation and 
implementation issues. There is also a division between the custom authorities 
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assessing the entry of services and goods (horizontal fragmentation), and by 
geographic imperatives of each country (vertical fragmentation), for instance when 
services are dealt with at the provincial, state or canton level.161 
Due to such fragmentation, over the years, there has been a shift 
‘transforming the framework of policy elaboration and implementation from that of 
labour market regulation to that of policing and national security.’162 This is 
probably one of the reasons why domestic implementation in ECOWAS, ASEAN 
and CARICOM, to name only these three, still remains a problem. This 
prioritisation of border control over constructive immigration programmes has 
created a growing ‘second-class’ working class with reduced labour protections in 
many cases.163 Another reason for this poor implementation, according to Julia 
Gray, is summed up in her conclusions as follows: 
‘(…) International agreements are only as effective as their domestic 
capabilities. Specifically, the implementation gap in RTAs as well as 
their ability to actually generate trade that would not have otherwise 
been created can be explained in large part by their domestic 
infrastructure as well as the strength of the rule of law in member 
states. If these two areas are lacking, government commitments at the 




From another angle, as outlined in the introduction, most studies share the 
common problem of statistical evidence to back their findings on labour migration 
with regard to employment, social protection, development and education. This 
surely goes hand in hand with both mismanagement and disinterest of some states 
for the international labour mobility agenda and legislation, despite pressures to get 
back to the table a decade ago already.165  
While states remain free and sovereign to govern their labour markets as they 
please, data sharing on migration at the international level could help coordinate 
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supply and demand and to make advised decisions on migration. It would clarify, 
for instance, labour input and productivity, labour market policy and negotiation, 
and tackle irregular arrivals, forced labour and trafficking. 166 However, there 
remains a lot of work to be done at the national level. Findlay and Warren sum up 
the global problem: 
‘Available data on services transactions show further shortcomings 
compared with those on manufacturing and merchandise. Only a 
limited number of industrialised countries collect and report services 
statistics at a relatively disaggregated level, while most developing 
countries only report data on commercial services (…). The IMF’s 
Balance of Payment Manual is the prime source of cross-country data 
on services trade, but there are many weaknesses in terms of data 
coverage, consistency among reporting countries, concordance and 
compatibility. Lack of diseggregation of data and difficulties in 
identifying trade by origin and destination are other problems in 
services statistics.’167 
Emerging positive outcomes 
 
Despite the unsatisfactory and insufficient data on migration movements, 
many scholars have already concluded to the benefits of labour migration. There 
appears to be a consensus among economists that, despite the difficulties in 
measuring negative distortions (on national wages or fluid integration, for instance), 
international labour migrations can expand global output. 168  Moreover, the 
discourse on international labour mobility often rests on the premise that 
immigrants might stay abroad permanently, minimising the magnitude of those 
actually returning home in what has been coined as ‘circular migrations’.169  
 
As Gordon H. Hanson puts it, even in cases of permanent immigration, 
immigrants are an asset for the country of origin. Diasporas of foreigners abroad 
facilitate trade channels in their new country with their former country and provide 
direct investments in them through remittance channels. 170  Literature on the 
positive impacts of remittances, such as enhanced economic security and poverty 
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reduction worldwide seem conclusive. 171  However, unsurprisingly, most 
discussions on remittances are overshadowed by the real yet poorly documented 
phenomenon of brain drain, which remains a concern when discussing 
immigration.172 
 
4.3.  A take on skill restrictions 
 
Changing demographics means that low-skilled workers will be needed in 
fast-developing and developed countries. RTAs strictly encouraging skilled 
migration, such as CARICOM, NAFTA and ASEAN, may therefore be missing out 
on potential gains.173 Our comparative analysis does not reflect an advantage from 
encouraging skilled migration only, rather the opposite. However, it is unsurprising 
that some RTAs use this approach to labour migration. As the ILO 
recommendations to ASEAN highlight: 
 
‘It is easiest to negotiate agreements to liberalise skilled labour 
migration because the number of potential migrants is smaller, the 
economic and public finance gains to receiving countries are 
generally larger, and skilled migrants often generate positive 
externalities where they live.’174 
 
The European Union arrangement shows that free movement of workers, 
whether low-skilled or skilled, can stabilise the labour market differences and even 
possibly increase salaries and reduce underemployment in developing countries.175 
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4.4.  The ‘buddy system’: a trade liability? 
 
Regional trade agreements with labour mobility provisions are primarily 
entered into between countries with geographic proximity and similar levels of 
development (though, as we have seen in some cases, there are instances of 
economic giants within the framework such as in the ECOWAS and the EU). On 
the plus side, this ‘buddy system’ structure seems to have facilitated quicker 
integration. We can take the examples of the EU, ECOWAS, CARICOM and 
MERCOSUR, which have adopted passports that proudly reflect their RTA. From a 
socio-political perspective, it has also reduced volatility, as RTAs play a role in 
conflict prevention and management, reduction of security treats and, it has been 
argued, in helping political stability.176 
 
This fairly new phenomenon of ‘regional passports’ is an interesting 
development and as Catherine Wihtol de Wenden noted, speaking of the EU 
citizenship, it marks a new step in migration studies. As she puts it: ‘[B]y 
recognizing the right to vote and the eligibility to citizenship of naturalized 
Europeans, Europe dissociated citizenship and nationality, something that appeared 
insurmountable by many jurors and politicians prior to 1992.’177 
 
Despite transaction and political costs of entering a regional trade 
agreement, the overall impression is an increased competitiveness and a way for 
countries to be more attractive to investment and make the country more credible 
and protected from ‘macroeconomic instability, terms of trade shocks, trade war, 
resurgence of protectionism in developed countries, etc.’178 Moreover, RTAs have 
proven to be powerful lobbies during international negotiations to make collective 
bargains in platforms such as the WTO. 179 
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On the other hand, RTAs are not always trade proof. When all the countries 
in the RTA are developing, they all become vulnerable to trade shocks unless there 
is an ‘asymmetric’ power to absorb the situation – such was the case of Nigeria in 
ECOWAS during the oil crisis.180 Indeed, RTAs are highly political and at times 
entered with limited consideration for repercussions on the domestic economy and 
politics.181 Least developed countries joining an RTA are increasingly vulnerable, 
as Kpodar and Imam explain: ‘countries at this stage of development joining an 
RTA would disproportionately expose themselves to foreign aggregate demand 
shocks, and be more susceptible to world price fluctuations.’182 They nonetheless 
conclude that this greater exposure to shocks may be outweighed by the benefits of 
RTAs such as ‘increased resilience and ability to adjust to crises’.183 
 
Our overview suggests that in the African context, there is a fragile cost-
benefit equilibrium between enhanced cooperation and trust among the RTAs as a 
means of preventing conflicts and among all RTAs the possibility that divergence 
in policy may create an economic imbalance lingers.184 This may be why a new 
trend is to merge trade agreements with one another, though many of these alliances 
are still at the negotiating table. Such is the case of talks of the MERCOSUR 
connecting with the European Union. Moreover, and unsurprisingly, these 
partnerships, often referred to as ‘new regionalism’, are mute when it comes to the 
possibility of labour mobility.185 However, a ray of hope (if not in a strict North-
South dynamic) is emerging, for instance with ASEAN teaming up with Australia 
and New Zealand (who also share a bilateral agreement) to facilitate the movement 
of service suppliers, independent professionals and other skilled workers.186This 
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4.5.  RTAs and the North-South paradigm 
 
North-South patterns at play 
 
Apart from NAFTA, which also happens to be one of the most restrictive 
RTAs, all of the RTAs examined are arranged in a pattern of overall ‘developing 
with developing’ and ‘developed and developed’ country. This phenomenon defeats 
the purpose of the comparative advantage theory and has led to much criticism 
against the GATS, seen as the culprit for failing to organise labour mobility at a 
global level. However, as an interesting historical side note, Marchetti and 
Mavroidis’ studied the genesis of the GATS, and report faux pas from all sides in 
the negotiation rounds of the GATS. From polarized views on the utility of a global 
framework on services, to resistance of applying the non-discrimination principle to 
the agreement, to limited knowledge on the magnitude of trade in services and to 
the initial disinterest by developing countries, the process leading to the GATS was 
a bumpy ride. They sum it up as follows: 
 
‘The agreement as such is no monument of clarity. Indeed, it is very 
much the outcome of an elaborate political compromise. The 
language chosen is often awkward, and it should come as no surprise 
that many of the disputes revolve round misunderstandings regarding 
the ambit of specific provisions. It is hard to imagine the GATS 
standing the test of time the way the GATT has done, still going 
strong more than 60 years after its original drafting. Yet, it is the 
negotiating history that we have discussed so far that explains why 
this has been the case: absent complex compromises, we would 
probably not have seen GATS in the first place. Now, the first 
decisive step has been taken. Future experience can make it a better, 
more workable document.’187 
 
The GATS’ spirit was to break the ‘private club’ structure of trade in 
services, but rather did the opposite. In this regard Thornberg and Edwards do not 
mince their words: 
 
‘The GATS, it is argued, is not a “development-friendly agreement”... 
but rather an instrument wielded by the industrialized world to 
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steadily curb the chances of development of the poorest countries, 
through successive rounds of negotiations.’188 
 
James Thuo Gathii appears to side with this view. Taking the case of 
integrated African economies, he underlines that integration of developing 
countries with each other might never work for the very reason that the level of 
development is too similar. He suggests the following:  
 
‘The argument here is that African economies need more than the 
increase in market size created by a common market because the 
increase in market size may be marginal relative to other limitations 
for firms such as high production costs and very low levels of income 
that make the effective size of regional markets small.’189 
 
This may also explain why a recent study concluded that RTAs entered 
between Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (hereafter 
OECD) countries have had more success than their non-OECD counterparts. 
Indeed, this study concludes that developed (and most OECD countries are 
developed), developing or underdeveloped countries will not react the same way to 
the creation of RTAs due to the ‘large differences among them’, though such 
differences are still premature to analyse, he argues. 190  Though South-South 
cooperation may feel more ‘natural’, efficiency gains are only truly felt in enhanced 
market access between the North and the South.191 
 
Potential benefits from breaking the paradigm 
 
Increased labour mobility has the potential to improve worldwide wealth and 
stabilise North-South inequalities and a small change could have major effects on 
this paradigm. Joel P. Trachtman reports that a 3 per-cent increase of temporary 
foreign workers in industrial countries could yield US$ 150 billion in worldwide 
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GDP, which would surpass the goals of the Doha Round, and by 2025, could reach 
a US$ 356 billion increase in total.192 Indeed, authors have already coined a term 
based on the theory that migrant workers raise GDP, ‘immigration surplus’, 
essentially the positive impact of immigration on the pre-existing population.193 
 
As discussed above, migrant workers from developing countries can have 
positive ‘feedback’ effects, including the transmission of remittances or by 
returning to their country of origin with added knowledge, networks and 
methods.194 Remittances, essentially the transmission of money from one relative to 
another, is already a major phenomenon that doubled between the 2000s and the 
mid 2010s, and remittances to developing countries were sitting at US$ 429 billion 
in 2016, nearly the equivalent of the whole of Belgium’s GDP.195 
   A rearrangement between the North and South RTAs would also deter the 
tremendous human and political costs generated by refugee management and also 
the market for human trafficking and smuggling.196 As François Crépeau puts it: 
‘most refugees would, however, wait in line and contribute some money for a 
meaningful opportunity of resettlement in the Global North.’197 Indeed, author 
Karen E. Bravo also wrote a paper specifically about the entanglement of failure to 
liberalise trade in services and human trafficking. To tackle this issue, she proposes 
to approach migrants as economic agents rather than as a ‘mal nécessaire’ and to 
add an Annex to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation to have 
an agreement on trade in labour specifically.198  
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Authors who have studied labour liberalisation indeed link illicit migration 
networks with the obstruction of trade in services and generalised neglect of ‘the 
movement of labour (people) attempting to respond to the economic incentives and 
disincentives arising from trade liberalization and the forces of globalization.’199 
There are studies to quash the North-South paradigm in labour mobility and reduce 
the barriers to trade in services, but such barriers need to be studied at the 
grassroots level further, because they are found in the administration, legislation or 
directives of each country at the national level.200  
 
The World Bank estimated in 2006 that the entry of 14.2 million skilled and 
low-skilled workers in high-income countries could yield global income gains of 
0.6 per cent or US$ 356 billion.201 A more idealistic hypothesis, in which all labour 
migration barriers would be removed completely as it was just two centuries ago, 
suggests an increase in the worldwide GDP by at least 4.3 per cent and up to 205 
per cent. The disparity and imprecision of the numbers is due to the parameters 
used to determine the productivity of the migrant worker in terms of education and 
skills within the new host country, but the general conclusion is that the benefits are 
positive.202  
 
The current configuration of regional trade agreements shows a perpetuation 
the North-South divide, which has resulted in the isolation of labour markets and 
fails to respond to the problems that we have outlined in Section 4.2 when it comes 
to trade shocks. A merger between regional trade agreements between developed 
and developing states would solve both the demographic gaps and shortages among 
employers in wealthier economies and indirectly contribute to the development of 
emerging economies through remittance channels and reduction of the ‘excess 
supply of labour’ stuck in unproductive locations.203 This new theory, coined as 
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‘new regionalism’, is discussed further in Section 5.3. 
4.6.  RTAs and the international framework 
 
Migrant workers are almost everywhere around the globe but the 
international legislation to protect, regulate and facilitate their movement is still 
inadequate. It is now a blend of customary law and binding and non-binding 
documents, with limited levels of popularity. 
 
International frameworks to protect migrant workers 
 
The framework to protect migrant workers is a blend of the Charter of the 
United Nations (1945), the ILO Convention No 97 (1947), the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the 1951 Refugee Convention, the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations (1963), the ILO Convention 143 (1975), the 
Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers (1990), the various human rights 
treaties and the two protocols on human trafficking and migrant smuggling. The 
International Organisation for Migration (hereafter IOM) also plays an important 
role in protecting migrant workers, with its strategic expertise in and out of the field 
along with many NGOs.204 Though some assess the IOM’s influence as limited, it 
remains the only non-UN international organisation specialised in migrations.205  
Despite few initiatives to push for further ratification of instruments on 
international labour mobility, Barbara Bogusz finds the relevant conventions on 
migration useful for protection purposes, as imperfect as they may be: 
‘These three Conventions together provide a comprehensive ‘values-
based’ definition and legal basis for national policy and practice 
regarding non-national migrant workers and their family members. 
They thus serve as tools to encourage States to establish or improve 
national legislation in harmony with international standards. They 
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are not simply human rights instruments.’206 
Author Ryszard Cholewinski sides with this view and deems that the 
legislative corpus on migration constitutes, as a whole, a form of international 
charter on labour migration. To consider them irrelevant due to low ratification 
levels is a ‘myth’ when considered as a whole, especially given that 86 of about 130 
countries that are substantially affected by migration issues have indeed ratified 
them, he argues.207  
 
International frameworks to facilitate labour migrations 
 
The framework to regulate and facilitate labour migrations, on the other hand, 
is mostly under the auspices of the World Trade Organisation’s GATS of 1994 (the 
Marrakesh Agreement). This remains the only international legal instrument to 
facilitate labour migration on a global scale – a rather surprising (and worrisome) 
fact, especially given that the service sector is the most rapidly expanding industry 
of the world economy, sitting at 60 per cent of worldwide production in 2014.208  
 
However, as Shin Yi Peng puts it, the GATS is ‘getting older without 
growing up.’209 She points to outdated schedules, too few obligations and discusses 
the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA), an interesting initiative of 22 WTO 
members (including 49 EU countries in symbolic addition) formulated in 2012 and 
gathering both developed and developing countries representing two thirds of the 
global trade in services. 210 TiSA is a WTO forum committed to facilitating the 
flow of services and may just be the ‘credible pathway to future multilateralization’ 
in addition to ideas proposed in this paper.211 However, this initiative is still at the 
working table and would need a majority vote from a ‘critical mass’ of members to 
be incorporated in the WTO structure along with an architecture similar to the 
GATS.212 
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Consequences of having an inadequate framework 
Outsourcing and offshoring is an ever more popular business trend and while 
this can bring jobs in developing economies, Taher Ajaali’s report highlights that 
this does not resolve scarcity of labour in industrialised countries and is not a 
solution accessible to smaller companies. And, while at it, the loss of tax revenues 
for the state as a result of outsourcing cannot be overlooked.213 In the end, 
outsourcing could be a dissertation topic of its own, as it is a ‘Catch 22’ in and of 
itself. Indeed, Poot and Strutt note that stricter immigration policies favour 
outsourcing, which creates domestic job losses, but favourable immigration 
policies may also cause social costs – though, the debate on the latter is still live.214 
The absence of a comprehensive international legal framework on labour 
migration is a ‘true economic problem’, according to Chaisse and Meng. They 
state: 
‘What is not new, but should still raise questions, is that economic 
migrations (concerning "migrant workers") remain, in the current 
period of globalization, very low in terms of relative and absolute 
volume. (…) In other words, goods, services, and capital are moving 
without much restriction while individuals remain stuck at borders or 
are subject to cumbersome rules.’215 
 
Moreover, there remains an additional problem with the international labour 
mobility system, which is the shortage of a clear tribune to address disputes among 
regional trade agreements. ASEAN, MERCOSUR and NAFTA focus on alternative 
resolution of such disputes as opposed to litigation in courts, but this creates 
problems of enforcement and ‘the majority of [litigious] cases end up stalled in 
administrative channels created under the trade terms’.216  Should regional disputes 
be brought to the WTO Dispute Settlement procedure in case of appeal, or, directly 
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when no mechanism is in place at the regional level? This is something to think 
about, and further debated in Section 5.3. 
 
One may very well ask at this point, despite the vague proposition to put 
international labour migration legislation back on the global agenda, where do we 
go from here? There are difficulties in the way of any recommendations due to 
potential disagreement from state to state on uniform external trade barriers, 
because immigration arrivals come at a great political cost, especially in this day 
and age. In the next section, we explore a series of recommendations based on our 
comparative exercise and existing propositions from stakeholders in labour 
migrations. 
5.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1.  Introductory comments 
 
To open up this section after the uneven results of RTA experiences in our 
comparative assessment, the Global Commission on International Migration has 
encouraging words to approach the challenges and potential recommendations for 
the international labour mobility system: 
 
‘One should not be surprised or dismayed by this situation. 
International migration is an emotive issue because it raises complex 
questions about the identity and values of individuals, households and 
communities, as well as societies as a whole. International migration 
is a controversial matter because it highlights important questions 
about national identity, global equity, social justice and the 
universality of human rights. International migration policy is difficult 
to formulate and implement because it involves the movement of 
human beings, purposeful actors who are prepared to make sacrifices 
and to take risks in order to fulfil their aspirations. Its challenges are 
radically different from those that arise in managing the movement of 
inanimate objects such as capital, goods and information.’217  
 
There are plenty of recommendations on the way forward, and for the OHCHR 
(Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights), it starts by outlining an 
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international shared vision on migration and mobility for the 2030 Development 
agenda. 218  However, ‘promotion of labour mobility is completely off the 
“mainstream development agenda” as it stands.’219 Thankfully, the private sector is 
already a pull factor, with its growing frustrations due to regulations that breach 
productivity and market expansion through the use of services, and in some cases, 
this has resulted in businesses moving offshore. As the report from the Global 
Commission on International Migration further states: 
‘Public sector representatives complain that they are unable to offer 
the services expected of them because they are prevented from filling 
labour market gaps with authorized migrant workers. Confronted 
with the rigidities that exist in the global labour market, some 
employers have sought alternative strategies, such as transferring all 
or part of their enterprises to countries that can provide an adequate 
supply of suitable labour at an attractive price, or subcontracting to 
smaller enterprises that are prepared to engage unauthorized migrant 
workers.’220 
 
   Patterns and ideas emerging from this exercise must now be channelled into 
recommendations, some of which have also been exposed in Section 4. 
 
5.2.  Challenging the narrative on migrant workers 
 
Skill complementarity between the North and South 
 
  
   A first comment to be made on the narrative on foreign workers is that our 
comparative assessment above does not reflect an advantage among RTAs 
restricting mobility to skilled workers only. The reality is that more inclusion of 
foreign low-skilled workers may even be beneficial. In a recent paper by Piyasiri 
Wickramasekara, she examines the various studies on this specific problematic, 
and reports her findings that ‘the development gains from low-skilled emigration 
were clear cut while high-skilled emigration had more complex effects’ and that 
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letting in part of ‘the huddled masses into developed countries to meet labour 
market needs would yield tremendous benefits.’221 
 
  Many countries primarily target highly skilled workers, even though in the 
long run (or immediately), low-skilled workers may become essential for labour-
short countries. Facilitating their arrival could fill in labour gaps and increase 
worldwide GDP, as discussed previously. Projected statistics show that restrictive 
policies on low-skilled workers ‘do not reflect actual labour market needs, being 
built on the myth that the demand is temporary or seasonal’.222 The statistics and 
predictions show a very tangible and enduring need for workers of all sorts in 
developed economies in the future. 
 
Indeed, one of the most common beliefs of detractors of international labour 
migration – almost a cliché at this point – is that immigrants will ‘steal the jobs’ of 
locals. This rhetoric usually rests on the premise that migrant workers might not 
have an economic benefit for the population and that there is no shortage of local 
workers to fill available positions. This line of reasoning fails to acknowledge that 
there are labour abundant and labour importer countries and the upcoming shortage 
of workers in the developing world.223 Thankfully, RTAs such as the MERCOSUR 
and ASEAN have grasped this idea and appear to have started benefiting most from 
it. 
 
   In this regard, the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants 
makes the following observations: 
 
‘Ageing populations have caused a shift in demographics that has led 
to labour shortages. In 2010, for the first time, more workers were 
retiring from the European labour market than joining it. By 2030, 
without changes in trends, the labour shortage in Europe is likely to 
rise to 8.3 million workers. At the same time, many member States 
have fertility rates below the rate of replacement. Similarly, by 2020, 
large economies such as Canada, China, the Republic of Korea and 
the Russian Federation will also face labour shortages.’224  
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Moreover, the predictions show that low-skilled professions in developed 
economies will be in great need. In this regard, Ronaldo Munck also rings the 
alarm: 
‘The US Department of Labour projections show that more than 50 of 
new jobs in the top 25 occupations will occur in this category. 
Similarly EU projections of labour demand show that the demand is 
not short-term or temporary. … At the same time many native workers 
shun certain occupations as incomes and living standards rise, making 
them immigrant-dependent sectors: agriculture, construction, cleaning, 
catering and other hospitality services, tourism, care work, domestic 
service, and the entertainment industry. The fact is that the demand for 
low-skilled workers cuts across all skills categories. …. This 
phenomenon concerns the full range of qualifications—from 
unskilled workers to top academic professionals.’225 
Munck concludes to a complementarity between highly skilled and low-
skilled professionals and it is safe to say even from this broad picture that the 
skilled worker as the immigrant of choice is a myth that should be revisited and 
sooner rather than later. As an aggravating factor, this distinction has fostered 
policies of discrimination, under which low-skilled workers become ‘undesirables’, 
in a system that runs afoul of the equality of chances principles.226 
The obsession on the mobility of skilled workers is tightly rooted in a major 
flaw of the GATS, which is its silence when it comes to the movement of 
agricultural or manufacture workers for instance, and yet has detailed provisions on 
the movement of accountants and workers in the finance sector.227 Therefore, it 
comes as no surprise that many trade agreements have followed suit: 
 
‘Trade agreements often contain clauses relating to the mobility of 
persons, often only referring to executives and highly skilled 
expatriates. Such clauses need to be expanded to migrants at all skills 
levels and inserted in a human rights framework, which would 
improve their coherence and integrate rigorous due diligence, 
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The fractured system as a cause of irregular migration 
 
Along with questioning the focus on high-skilled worker migrations only, it 
may be time to consider multi-year temporary work permits for the developing 
world, because the system as it stands is fostering irregular migrations and visa 
overstays. 229  This, in a way, challenges another myth in the narrative on 
immigration which is that citizens from developing countries cannot be trusted and 
will overstay their time in the developed world.  
Behind the well-intentioned policies of RTAs, mechanisms to ensure a 
smooth transition before and after integration have not been thought through in 
many cases and therefore most systems have failed to circumvent the most 
damaging and most contentious issue relating to migration, that is, irregular 
immigration, which moves at a far greater speed than the fractured labour mobility 
system:   
‘Smugglers and exploitative employers are presently implementing 
the labour mobility that many labour markets need in order to thrive. 
Through creative visa opportunities for work at all skill levels, 
including for low- wage migrants, States could considerably reduce 
the number of migrants coming through irregular means or 
overstaying their visa or permit.’230 
 
 
The failures of the GATS and of RTAs to facilitate North-South movements 
have indeed led some countries such as India and many South American countries 
to propose to fill the voids of the system with the creation of ‘GATS visas’, to 
propose a wider definition of what a ‘service supplier’ entails and to push for 
further commitments by member states.231 As to the GATS visa, a gathering of 
OECD countries in 2004 already suggested potential benefits of introducing such a 
document:  
‘A GATS visa would clearly separate mode 4 entrants from permanent 
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migrants and result in i) reduced administrative costs, faster 
processing and approval; ii) fees limited to administrative costs; and 
iii) better records of mode 4 trade. Building safeguards and employer 
sanctions into the visa would prevent abuse and ensure the temporary 
nature of mode 4 movement.’232  
Additionally to considering a GATS visa, Jurje and Lavenez also suggest 
harmonising immigration visa requirements and procedures, and also questioning 
the relevance of quotas, whether in RTAs or at the international level.233  
Positive narratives need empirical evidence 
Labour mobility’s benefits must be backed by additional empirical studies as 
to the alleged economic benefits of immigrants for the host country, which are not 
truly possible without international partnerships on data sharing. Otherwise, the 
narrative on immigration will remain ambiguous. Even though the WTO and the 
ILO recurrently recommend numerous initiatives, such as the adoption and 
utilisation of international labour migration databases and of common statistical 
standards, migration movements among RTAs are poorly documented.  
The only substantial endeavour to date appears to be the Global Bilateral 
Migration Database of the World Bank, collecting migration patterns of 226 
countries.234 Initiatives have also started to take place at the regional level, for 
instance between Vietnam and Malaysia among the ASEAN, which have decided to 
share knowledge and data on inward and outward migrations, which has helped 
coordinate the placements of workers, a win-win situation for both countries.235 
This is where the international community should be heading, to fully benefit from 
trade facilitation in services.  
In the meantime, the studies discussed strongly suggest rethinking the 
obsession on skill-based migration and to question assumptions about labour 
migration as well as migration movements as a whole. 
 
																																																								
232 Chaisse, Julien and Lloyd Meng, Ibid, Note 231, Page 16. 
233 Jurje, Flavia and Sandra Lavenex, Ibid, Note 72, Page 21. 
234 Flahaux, Marie-Laurence and Hein De Haas. ‘African Migrations: trends, patterns, drivers.’ 
Comparative Migration Studies 4.1 (2016) Springer. Web. Jan. 13, 2018, Page 6. 
235 OHCHR, Ibid, Note 218, Page 12. 
	 54 
5.3.  Towards a global mobility framework 
 
 
   In the end, looking at the international mobility framework on migration, 
there is a feeling of fragmentation, a maze in which individuals willing to work and 
employers in need of filing shortages have trouble connecting. RTAs on labour 
mobility are a manifestation of a desire to improve the system but also that the 
international framework on labour migration is both unpopular and inadequate, and 
the GATS as it stands is impersonal, too technical and an inadequate instrument to 
regulate migrations in services at the international level.  
 
Bring back hierarchy in the system 
 
   Building on what other academics have written on the subject, we see two 
avenues. The first one is to push for the superiority of WTO laws over RTAs 
legislation, with a view to avoid conflicts of laws. This could help bring back the 
lack of a hierarchy in the system as pointed out by Stephen Kim Park.236 Indeed, if 
RTAs have their own dispute settlement systems yet are still supposedly under the 
hospice of the WTO, there seems to be a door open for forum shopping (which 
appears to be just what is happening in the case of NAFTA).237 It also nurtures a 
David and Goliath structure between the least and most developed members of the 
RTA.238 In the end though, trade disputes continue to be heard at the WTO ‘even in 
RTAs between partners with intensive trade flows and potentially intractable trade 
irritants.239’  
 
   In the context of services, the WTO superiority would also be symbolic, 
given that many RTAs have pushed labour mobility far beyond the GATS 
commitments. This new phenomenon of RTAs pushing the boundaries of the 
GATS studied in this paper, coined as ‘GATS-plus commitments’, may just be the 
new 21st century laboratory for labour mobility that is needed: 
 
‘There is a sense that RTAs in the area of services include GATS-plus 
commitments that could be seen as “testing grounds” for further 
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liberalisation. Some countries have used RTAs to lock-in domestic 
reforms or to reiterate obligations under the GATS. But most 
agreements are more ambitious and provide market access 
commitments in new sectors.’240 
 
Who can help? 
 
   The conservatism of labour migration policy in the worldwide trade agenda 
is a blind spot that has caused distortion on the global market, has failed to tackle 
labour as a production factor as mobile as goods and, consequently, has created an 
‘atomized nation-state world view.’241 Additionally, the current legal framework 
on labour migration is borderline incomprehensible, to a point where scholars have 
coined the term ‘spaghetti bowl’ to describe the overlapping provisions and the 
legal vacuum that remain in other themes.242 It is no wonder that it shows limited 
popularity among RTAs.  
 
   Which international body or supervising authority should take 
responsibility to set up an international labour mobility scheme that actually works 
is open for debate, and so are the potential existing or hypothetical legal 
instruments to regulate it. As pointed out above, though the UN, ILO, Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (hereafter UNHCR), IOM, the World Bank and the OCDE grouping all 
already play a key role in issuing parameters and directives, only the WTO has true 
power enabled by proactive and ratified legislation.243  It seems to remain the best 
platform for dialogue and negotiations on labour mobility as an economic driver. 
 
Instrumentalisation: the tribulations of the GATS 
 
The question remains as to how prospective international legislation on 
migration and UN and NGO directives may connect with existing or prospective 
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RTAs’ frameworks? The timid progression of regional trade agreements on labour 
mobility shows a renewed interest for freer movements of service providers and, 
therefore, migrant workers, but the same cannot always be said of their usage of the 
available international legal instruments. The ASEAN and the MERCOSUR 
countries appear to be relying on the GATS to a certain extent, but there remains an 
ever-growing necessity to have a comprehensible and international plan on labour 
mobility tying the social conventions on migrant workers with limited popularity 
with the pragmatic roles that they can play as economic agents.244 Indeed, service 
providers are rarely perceived as production agents or exporters even though they 
should be.245 
The GATS is the only international instrument providing parameters to the 
temporary movement of self-employed or employed service providers, and it has a 
rather restrictive legal scheme.246 Indeed, the GATS does not provide any policy on 
visas, social security and recognition of academic credentials.247 Moreover, Mode 4 
of trade in services, the only true commitment to labour mobility that authorises the 
movement of workers without a commercial presence, is operating at very modest 
rates: 
 
‘Mode 4 flows stand at less than 5% of world services trade, 
compared to 55–60% of worldwide services delivered by Mode 3 
(commercial presence), 25–30% by Mode 1 (cross-border supply) and 
10–15% by Mode 2 (consumption abroad).’
248 
 
Many authors have taken a closer look at Mode 4 and the GATS as a whole 
and conclude that the legal architecture is too technical, with insufficient 
definitions, to a point where it might even be misunderstood and voluntarily 
underused by states.249 It thus appears that most countries have rejected the GATS 
as a platform for their immigration goals, despite its well-established structure and 
coercion mechanism, as opposed to bilateral and multilateral agreements with non-
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binding commitments.250 As Anukoonwattaka and Heal put it in a recent United 
Nations publication: 
 
‘The progressive liberalization of international trade through 
successive rounds of negotiations in the GATT and WTO has not been 
mirrored by any corresponding multilateral agreement on labour 
mobility.’251 
 
Other authors highlight the fear of the ‘national treatment principle’ 
imbedded in the GATS.252 Many RTAs have outright breaches of the national 
treatment principle such as requirements or restrictions on freedom of movement, 
difference in fiscal treatment, and when it comes to property access or 
ownership.253 The same goes for the fear of the transparency, predictability and 
non-discrimination, core principles of the GATT. All in all, the RTA exception may 
have ‘eroded’ or put in doubt the beliefs of these principles.254 
 
Additionally, according, to Thornberg and Edwards, the GATS shows the 
inability of the drafters to create uniform schemes on repatriation and tax 
treatments, to set up an enforcement mechanism and, most importantly, to logically 
connect it to the GATT, to a point where trade negotiations in services among the 
WTO and between countries with RTAs do not generate any comparative 
advantage.255  
 
Therefore, it appears that it may be time for a more open and user-friendly 
GATS 2.0. Despite the unpopularity and fragmentation of the GATS, it remains 
‘the only collective effort at liberalizing skill flows at the multilateral level.’256 In 
Marion Panizzon’s paper for the Dialogue on Globalization of 2010, she argues 
that, despite its imperfections, it may play a significant role in the future, but must 
be redesigned to deliver a clear understanding of the advantages of using it. It must 
also comprise additional provisions on overstays and irregular entries and 
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safeguards in case of a surge of foreign workers, to protect local economies.257 Van 
Grasstek further adds that the GATS also has gaps when it comes to provisions on 
subsidies and domestic regulations on services, and at the very least on 
governmental services. He further notes that emergency safeguards have been 
implemented in ASEAN and MERCOSUR, which could yield interesting studies 
for the purpose of GATS negotiations.258 In a bold proposition by Geza Feketekuty, 
she even argues for the integration of the GATT with the GATS into one legal 





Beyond reframing the GATS according to the many suggestions outlined or 
via the introduction of TiSA in the WTO, the other avenue to find a logical and 
progressive way out of the international labour mobility labyrinth might be to invest 
in ‘new regionalism’, where bilateral and multilateral agreements are joined with 
one another. 260  We would be highly interested to see any two multilateral 
agreements discussed above finding common grounds on labour mobility. The 
European Union has discussed a potential partnership with the MERCOSUR. 261 
There has also been an attempt to conclude an agreement between the EU and 
CARIFORUM (CARICOM signatories to the Georgetown Agreement with other 
Pacific Group of states (ACP)). 262  However, as is often the case in many 
arrangements among the dozens of them at the bilateral level, these potential 
mergers are regarding goods, not services. Nonetheless, the EU has also been 
negotiating with ASEAN with regard to labour mobility specifically.263  
 
For those fearful of a flood or surge of immigrants, one can take the dreamy 
(but oh-so achievable) hypothesis of an agreement on labour mobility between the 
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EU and the MERCOSUR, with the buffer zone of the Atlantic Ocean (and airplane 
costs) to prevent ‘immigrant floods’ (pun intended). The same goes for a 
hypothetical partnership between NAFTA and ASEAN and the Pacific Ocean. 
There would be no need for walls. Such integrated forms of cooperation on services 
may be the new ‘multilateralize[d] regionalism’ that we need, instead of endlessly 
wondering whether regionalism harms or facilitates trade or why multilateralism is 




We would argue that the most pressing need to facilitate the flow of labour to 
the North may be coming from the African continent, which has a surplus of low-
skilled workers looking for work.265 Authors Witada Anukoonwattaka and Adam 
Heal suggest that developing countries could trade enhanced labour market access 
in exchange for the commodities of the developing country.266 Moreover, the 
tumultuous Uruguay and Doha Round of the WTO meetings recorded important 
debates on the possibility of trading more commercial presence (Mode 3) for 
developed countries in exchange for more market access for service providers 
(Mode 4) of developing countries.267 Developing countries also requested extended 
stays, end visa quotas, overzealous qualification and economic need verification – 
all of which is still very much at the lobbying table.268 It is interesting to note the 
change of tone through the years, given that in the 1988 Punte del Este negotiations 
prior to the GATS, the developing countries showed limited interest to export their 
workers and ‘adopted a passive – if not obstructive – attitude towards the 
negotiations, at least early on.’269 
 
A report from the United Nations ten years ago already warned that North-
South free trade agreements could be beneficial, unless fellow developing countries 
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are competing over the same developed country.270 What would happen if this 
exchange were multilateral, and most importantly, with regard to services and not 
only goods? One would have to wait and see. But which RTAs will be bold enough 
to act as a guinea pig? Our response would be that this is what pilot projects are for. 
 
Win-win or no win 
 
The bottom line is that as highlighted by Pécoud and de Guchteneire, a key 
principle in the governance of freedom of movement is that no state will 
unilaterally open its borders, for fear of becoming a target of dumping of foreign 
minorities, poor and unemployed or retired individuals.271 The system as it stands 
demonstrates that indeed, there is little room for idealism in negotiating the 
movement of labour. Nonetheless, it may be time for a win-win pilot project on 
labour mobility between labour-short and labour-abundant RTAs, that goes beyond 
the conservatism of NAFTA. It only makes sense, given that ‘most of the demands 
in services are still made by industrialised countries’.272 However, to meet this 
demand in the context of regional trade agreements, developing countries will have 
to break a pattern showing their feeble interest to include services in their existing 
RTAs.273 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we have reviewed the most prominent RTAs on labour 
mobility and discussed their frameworks, the institutions governing them and the 
legal resources they have set in place for themselves, and outlined their main 
achievements and remaining challenges. This exercise has allowed us to move on to 
our most important observations, namely that many RTAs are plagued by 
mismanagement issues and are even, at times, fostering more irregular movements, 
despite many interesting initiatives such as the creation of regional structures and 
legal instruments and the adoption of shared passports.   
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According to our analysis, restriction based on skill has not yielded a 
comparative advantage and is also fostering these irregular movements. We have 
also outlined the trade liabilities of associating countries with similar levels of 
development together, along with the consequence of perpetuating North-South 
paradigms once again. Finally, we have highlighted that most of the RTAs 
reviewed are developing their own legal frameworks, with limited interest for the 
available international framework or instruments, which are at best a source of 
inspiration for most. These observations have led us to propose to challenge many 
preconceived ideas on international mobility and to share our thoughts on ways 
forward for an international framework on mobility, such as a more inclusive 
GATS or enhanced ‘new regionalism’.  
 
Despite all the constructive criticism outlined in this paper, we wish to 
conclude on a positive note. States involved in an RTA with labour mobility 
provisions share the belief of a more fluid and pragmatic approach to services, and 
this is something that should be celebrated. Though most arrangements are nowhere 
near the level of integration and organisation that Europe has set up, this does not 
have to be a dramatic conclusion. As Andrés Malamud puts it: 
 
‘It is now clear that institutional mimetism has not taken place, and 
that the EU is not yet a standard integration model but a unique 
phenomenon that can serve as a point of reference and inspiration but 
cannot be transplanted or replicated wholesale.’274 
 
Increased labour mobility has the potential to improve worldwide wealth and 
stabilise North-South inequalities. There is evidence that ‘broad restrictions on 
migration diminish human welfare’ and that international migration therefore 
‘raises gross incomes for migrants, while it redistributes incomes within sending 
and receiving countries’.275 And it is not the only logical path for moral reasons: 
‘Economically speaking, freedom of movement is potentially more 
rewarding than trade liberalization. For example, a study by Lant 
Pritchett estimated that the benefits of freeing movement are much 
bigger than the trade liberalization and foreign aid combined. In fact, 
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this claim has been included in the pantheon of economic 
orthodoxy.’276 
 
The positive effects of further service liberalization can be felt by the creation 
of three different channels, according to Kenneth A. Reinert. It creates a balance of 
payment channel (earnings, remittances and increased capital), a poverty alleviation 
and development channel (cnew jobs, increasing foreign investments) and an 
economic and competitiveness growth channel (facilitating production, skill 
transfer and building infrastructure, especially in manufacturing). 277  Delay in 
concluding a functional international law on trade in services contradicts principles 
of competition shared worldwide, ‘a model that betrays both trade liberalization 
theory and free-market principles’.278   
Negotiation and confidence-building efforts between nations converging on 
the economic and social level seem to have facilitated numerous regional 
agreements on labour mobility. At the same time, looking back at the literature in 
migration studies of the early 2000s, some perverse effects that scholars warned us 
about have already started to take place. In 2009, Bimal Ghosh hypothesised that 
regional groupings could evolve in different directions and that tensions would 
ensue between countries of inbound and outbound migration.279 Such appears to be 
the case today between the European Union,  NAFTA and citizens from or reaching 
the ECOWAS.  
In September 2016, the World Bank issued the following alarming statistic: 
‘The working-age population (15+) in the developing countries will 
increase by 2.1 billion by 2050. If national employment is maintained 
at the same rate as in 2015, only 1.2 billion of those people will find 
employment in their own country, leaving nearly 900 million in search 
of work.’280 
It is not too late to provide a coordinated response to this pool of workers, which is 
nearly 12 per cent of the world population. In the end, whether RTAs are ‘building 
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or stumbling blocks’ as academia has coined the dilemma, a building has already 
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